

Secret

SECURITY INFORMATION September 1953

Dear GWR:

1. Am disappointed not to have heard from you by now either overtly or covertly. In view of the fact that many other members of the staff have heard from you, I have lied and said I got a postcard from you. I assume that you left some correspondence to be forwarded to me following your departure from Washington and I am most hopeful that Headquarters will have remembered to include it in this week's pouch. I trust you received my first two notes. I have felt the need during the past week of giving you another roundup of current events, so here goes.
2. As a review of the "CM" file will reveal, the [] operation has turned out most disappointingly. I personally feel very ^{badly} ~~bad~~ about it and cannot entirely convince myself that I may either have done things which I ought not to have done or have not done things which I ought to have done. As you will see, the whole thing broke very fast and there were times when it was not possible to give as much consideration to my correspondence as I would have liked. The pressure has been, on several occasions, very intense and I now fully appreciate your wisdom in limiting the scope of my operational responsibilities in your absence. Anyway, as you can see, the [] operation almost left the track entirely. I attribute the initial breakdown to:

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a) DIR's failure to keep all ~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~ parties adequately informed as to the commitments which had been made, etc.-- namely, []'s commitments to [] (it appeared that SMUNI or [] himself could have prevented that element of the situation). In fact, it seemed to me that SMUNI took a most inflexible position throughout, apparently insisting on having its own way in every detail and reacting like a small spoiled child when certain other elements interfered. It is hard to believe that persons in SMUNI's position would not be thoroughly frank and objective, yet the ill-natured and viciously worded assessment of [] leads us to suspect that such was the case. ^{b)} It may have been that the explanation I offered in []-260 was entirely the underlying cause, but even if this were the case SMUNI's comments on [] seemed unnecessarily vindictive and uncalled for.

~~However,~~ So that as it may, I assume that you will untangle the situation before your departure. I personally feel that it would not be a bad idea ~~at all~~ for you to stop in Germany on your way back but that, of course, is a matter for and Headquarters to decide. ^{c)} There are a number of things I could say about the development of the whole unhappy situation but I am sure they are sufficiently obvious to you. If you feel that the whole mess could have in any way been prevented by me, I am sorry. I called the shots as I saw them. ^{d)} I am presently in a quandary as to what to do with Nostril. As a result

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of []'s actions, the [] phase of the operation went off to Nostril's satisfaction and he is now quite prepared to proceed with [] I have not in any way apprised him of what has happened with respect to [] other than to advise him that [] reached his destination safely. I can see nothing to be gained by rehashing [] with NOSTRIL. We either accept NOSTRIL's judgments or we don't--in which case we'd better get ourselves a new boy.^{el} [] continues to be a problem with respect to his recommendation of NOSTRIL for a job with Burger.

3. Returning briefly to the [] fiasco, I cannot stress too strongly my feeling that a great deal more Headquarters coordination would have prevented the whole business. Incidentally, was EGQW-9953 ever forwarded to us? I find no record of it but wish you would check in Headquarters if you have time. I also rather suspect that my oft-stated forebodings concerning the situation in Germany appear to be all too true. If they were sufficiently well into the business at that end, this whole thing would surely have gone much more smoothly and they might have found [] to be a bit more desirable. Presumably, [] was one of our very best candidates, and if they can find nothing better than that to say about him then we had just as well forget about it and focus our energies on more potentially fruitful lines of endeavor. What they expected from a man of []'s background I can't imagine. I can't help

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but observe in passing the ~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~ assessment sounds as though it were written by a Princeton graduate, class of 1953.

4. Another item which urgently requires your attention in Washington is the ~~C~~ situation. As ~~C~~ himself says, "we'd better either fish or cut bait." I think we are being unreasonable to allow him to indulge in any further operational activity unless we are prepared to fully explore and perhaps to back up his recommendations. If the security aspects of the situation are found to be paramount and that his only value lies, therefore, in the ~~C~~ operation, I cannot help but feel that the sooner we tell him so the better. I believe that the three individuals on whom I submitted PRGs do in fact show signs of making ~~C~~ pay off. I know of and concur with your feelings with respect to the threat which ~~C~~ imposes to ourselves and our other operations but see no reason why he could not be adequately cutout from us so that if he does blow himself no great damage would be done. ~~He has~~ he has, after all, to keep going this long and he has gotten deeper and deeper into operational activity without thus far coming to grief. It seems to me that he may provide us with the coverage we need in ~~C~~ and it does seem a shame to let the operation go down the drain after wasting all this time and money on it--just when there does seem to be some possibility of its paying off. In conclusion, I believe that adequate operational potential exists to justify the continuance of the ~~C~~ operation. This, of course, hinges upon the condition that

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we will be able to provide adequate supervision--a subject on which I will speak later. [] has until now been thinking in terms of being assigned to another area at the conclusion of his tour here. I, however, think we might consider bringing him back here. He points out that, if he is to go home with any intention of returning, his leave should be in line with his cover--specifically, that he should not depart until the end of the term in February or in June. His cover for the moment appears to be adequate although whether it is satisfactory for another two and a half years is a subject for considerably more thought than I have been able to give it. He has really got his feet on the ground in [] [] knows everyone there, gets all the local gossip, and is regarded by his own admission as a "sort of character." I have advised him to continue to encourage this impression since it seems to be his most natural way of operating, and there seems little point in trying to change it at this late date, even if it were possible to do so.

5. One thing which I have not been able to do is to keep up with lateral pouch correspondence with [] [] [], and other points. This seems to me to be just one thing too many and it also seems to me to be one of the many little things in which Headquarters could assist us if it would. I have on hand, for instance, several reports which would be of interest to [] [] but I have simply not got the time or energy to get out a [] pouch.

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6. Old reliables, [] and [] continue to operate in their usual facile manner. I am particularly delighted with []'s progress as indicated in several recent dispatches and reports. I have a faint suspicion that [] is not exactly working himself to death in your absence but I don't know him well enough to pin him down and I am far too busy to complain about lack of volume at this point. So, unless I catch him plainly loafing on the job, I am not going to make an issue of it. It is not, of course, my place to congratulate you on the job you have done with these two men, but I can say that in working with them the value of sound development and careful training has been very clearly driven home to me. If only it had been possible for you to give such attention to [] from the beginning!
7. In conclusion I would like to say a few things in connection with a subject which we have often discussed before, and that is the future of this Station. The following are my personal observations and are tendered only for your consideration. It seems to me that with the addition of [] to our staff we can, by working at the same level of overtime and near exhaustion, hope to maintain the continuing exploitation of our current assets at the level previously established (i.e., without adequate periodic operational review, cross referencing, research, etc). However, I doubt if the prospect of another tour of operating at that pace appeals to you any more than it

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does to me. I feel that our operations have of necessity not been as thorough in terms either of complete exploitation or of security as they could and should be. This ~~has been~~ has been unavoidable, but I suspect that it makes you as uncomfortable as it does me. It seems a shame that with the existing potential of this Station we are prevented from fully exploiting all operations purely by lack of an adequate staff. (I have been advised, much to my disgust, by [] that there were literally hundreds of competent females practically begging for overseas assignments at the time she departed Headquarters and that the Personnel Division was discouraging all applications.) Because of the existing situation in the office and in view of the current fantastic RIFing program (which incidentally has not seriously affected the Embassy to date) it seems likely that we could adequately absorb only one more person into our present setup. It seems to me that this person might more smoothly be introduced into the picture during my absence since this would lessen the initial impression of three persons being employed in one minor section []

[]. At any rate, the type of person which we most need, in my estimation, is a good all-around office "utility man", presumably a girl--the office could then be organized along the following lines of responsibility:

- a) [] Overall Station direction plus approximately half the operational work
- b) [] The reports function plus approximately half

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the operational work, plus ^{SECURITY INFORMATION} most of the commo work.

c) "X": All of the mass of administrative detail which makes our lives so difficult at present, i.e., the quarterly and semi-annually administrative reports, all pouching and correspondence, mechanics, filing, some of the typing, etc., plus perhaps some of the commo work.

d) [] To handle carding and volume typing requiring little supervision. [] would continue to do virtually the same work she is doing now. The system which I am using at present, except for mechanical complications, seems to work very well. In the course of one 2 to 4 hour session with [] I am able to unload a complete debriefing including all reports, carding information and dispatches resulting from a meeting with one of the agents. This is necessary about once every 10 days - O.K.?

8. I believe that an organization such as is outlined above would permit us to do a really decent job with our existing operations and to perhaps initiate, at the most, one or two of our most promising ^{but} yet untapped potential assets. I am really most anxious, as I know you are, to milk this Station for everything it is worth and if I could feel that we would be able to do so, my own desire to return to [] would be much stronger.

9. I plan to approach []

[] we discussed prior to your departure and to include a [] on this subject in this week's pouch. I have

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thus far no firmly developed desires about my home leave and I am quite open to any ideas from either you or Headquarters on that subject. I only request that I not be shipped home in January, February or March; if I am not to go home for Christmas, I would much prefer not to go home until April or May. If it is considered necessary for me to go home in February I will do so, however.

10. The Ambassador's car was finally sold yesterday for 700 JDs. They have not to my knowledge found any takers for yours.
11. For your information it appears that the Yarmouk scheme is going to be cancelled in favor of a plan involving the use of Lake Tiberias as a ^{holding} hold reservoir. The latter plan is, of course, more favorable to the Israelis but will require negotiations and agreements between Jordan, Syria, and Israel and although the State Department experts (other than those on the scene) claim that the substitute plan is also more beneficial in the long run to Jordan, I cannot see the Arabs accepting this change in plan gracefully nor can I see anything more than a bigger black eye for the United States resulting from it. The Chargé is violently upset by the situation, especially since he has been very neatly placed over a barrel by the Department. Having gone on record as strenuously opposing the new plan, his objectives have been overruled and he has been charged with the responsibility of selling the new idea to the Jordanians--thus if he succeeds in selling the new idea, as he puts it, "by some miracle," the Department will say that his original fears were ungrounded

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JD 190.00
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and unjustified. If he fails, ^{INFORMATION} the Department will say that he was lukewarm from the start and that he did not really try to sell the idea.

12. It appears that the new Ambassador will probably be coming to Amman at about the same time you will be returning. It seems to me that the idea of your traveling on the same ship with him might be very worthy of consideration. Our relations with [] are, I feel safe in saying, fairly good at the moment. What the [] position will be, however, remains to be seen. It could be extremely valuable for you to establish yourself with him before Lyndh has a chance to upset the applecart in any way.

P.S. [] is afraid he may get "RIFed" - That would really fix our wagon, wouldn't it? (He, incidentally, thinks he'd like to work for us. He understands nothing could be done until he returns to Wash at the end of his tour) He thinks my principal function is extracting info from the local press. He hasn't the faintest suspicion concerning your status. Anyway, the possibility of [] sudden departure reinforces our urgent need for additional stenographic assistance.

Please don't be alarmed by the number of reports I've been able to send in - it's all been made possible by [] **Secret** I'm really very good. The processing of the info isn't the most time consuming element of the job. ^{IMMIGRATION}